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The Responsiveness of Remittances to the Oil Price: 
The Case of the GCC 
 
We investigate the responsiveness of remittances from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries to the changes in the price of crude oil. Most of the GCC countries rank in the top 
20 remitting countries in the world. We find that oil price elasticity of remittances is around 
0.4. While most studies have examined the impact of remittances on the real economic 
activities in the receiving countries, this study emphasises the impact of remittances on the 
remitting countries. We examine various policy implications with regard to macroeconomic 
shocks, monetary policy and fiscal policy of the GCC countries. 
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 Introduction  
 
Over the last two decades world-wide remittances have been increasing tremendously. The 
increase in the stock of international migrants and the reduction in the cost of transferring 
money have spurred a significant surge in the international flow of migrant’s remittances. 
Recent estimates by the World Bank indicate that remittances flows in 2007 exceed $ 300 
billion.
 1 Values of remittances are based on official estimates by the countries’ Central Banks 
and the World Bank. The monetary transfers that are not channeled through financial 
institutions and other formal channels (such as Western Union) go undocumented. Therefore 
the official values are generally an underestimate of the actual remittances. 
  The significant amount of these monetary flows induced researchers and policy 
makers to further study remittances. While some of these studies mainly discuss the 
determinants of these flows (El-Sakka, M. and McNabb, R. (1999), Vargas-Silva (2008)) 
others have focused on the consequences of remittances on either the real macroeconomic 
activities (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), Chami et al (2005)) economic growth (Osili 
(2007), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), Gupta et al (2009)) or on the microeconomic levels 
(household level) (Edwards and Ureta (2003), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006)). In 
summary, the literature on remittances has focused on the effects of remittances on the 
receiving countries. To the best of our knowledge, no study has ever discussed the effects of 
remittances on the remitting countries. Consequently, the literature has been focusing on the 
destination rather than the source. In this study, we aim to shed some light on remittances’ 
effect on the remitting economies taking advantage of the fact that remittances in the region 
of study represent a significant proportion of that region’s GDP. This paper contributes to the 
remittances literature in two ways: first it investigates remittances effects on the economies of 
the remitting country, and second, it examines remittances in the Middle East, namely the 
Gulf region which that has been largely understudied mainly due to lack of data. Specifically, 
2 
 we examine the responsiveness of remittances to the price of crude oil using data from the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Given the high dependence of these economies 
on oil revenue, a higher price of oil instigates more investment and consequently higher 
economic growth. This increase in aggregate demand is met with a parallel increase in 
demand for labour (both skilled and unskilled) and is translated into more income for 
expatriates and a surge in remittances. 
Background 
The GCC countries comprise Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates. These countries have experienced a strong economic growth in the last 
three decades. For instance, the GCC mean annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
rate for the period between 2002 and 2006 ranges between 2.1 per cent to 9.4 per cent with an 
average of 6.5 per cent (Migration and Remittances, Factbook 2008). A driving force behind 
this growth is an increasingly growing labour force that is mainly constituted of expatriates 
from all over the world.  A unique feature of the GCC countries is that they have been 
pegging their various currencies to the US dollar since the early 1970s, when the US 
abolished the Gold Standard and the US dollar was adopted as the official trading currency of 
oil. Since then the GCC economies follow closely the US monetary policy. They cut interest 
rate when the Federal Reserve Bank eases and they raise it when the Fed tightens regardless 
whether these policies are suitable for these economies at the time of execution. It is not then 
surprising that interest rates in GCC countries show tandem volatility with the Federal Funds 
Rate (Figure 1).
2 Net exports are expected to amplify when oil prices peak as GCC depend 
mainly on oil exports. This is shown in particular in the late 1970s and early 1980s and again 
in the 2000s (Figure 2). 
In most countries, migrants do not constitute the majority of the total population. 
However, the GCC countries are unique in this regard since the expatriates population 
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 constitute on average more than 50 per cent of the total population with the highest being 
Qatar (78.3%) and the lowest is Oman (24.5%). In addition, four of GCC countries are 
among the top 10 countries in the world in terms of migrants as in terms of percentage of 
total population. These are Qatar (1
st), United Arab Emirates (3
rd), Kuwait (5
th) and Bahrain 
(10
th) (Figure 3). 
The strong presence of large migrant population makes the GCC countries among the 
largest remitting countries both in terms of total value and in terms of percentage of GDP 
despite their relative small-size economies. For instance, Saudi Arabia was the second top 
remitting country in the World in 2006 with an estimated value of remittances close to $ 16 
billion, placing it next to the United States. Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain all show up in the top 
30 sender countries in terms of remittances. Bahrain ranks 4
th in the World as a top 
remittance sender country with remittances equal to 12 per cent of its GDP.  Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait both remit five per cent and four per cent worth of their GDP and rank 9
th and 
12
th respectively. Table 1 exhibits the total estimate of remittances from GCC in 2006 which 
is around $ 32.7 billion. The official estimate by the World Bank for total world remittances 
in 2006 is $ 306 billion of which 11 per cent come out of the GCC countries.  
The significant economic growth of the GCC countries in the last decade has triggered a large 
interest in this region. Analyzing the volatility of remittances from the Gulf will allow the 
governments of the GCC countries to weigh the overall outcomes of decreasing oil prices on 
the real activities of their economies. The latest global financial crisis and the sudden decline 
in oil prices highlight the need of such studies in order for policy makers to be able to 
stabilise output and prices.  
This remarkable growth that the GCC countries have experienced is also explained by 
an enormous demand for crude oil. The GDP of these countries closely follow the price of 
oil. Although the GCC countries have been diversifying their economies and moving away 
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 from their full dependence on oil revenue, oil prices still play a major role in the performance 
of these economies (Fasano and Iqbal (2003)). Therefore, we expect that any changes in the 
price of oil are directly reflected in the remittances outflow of these countries. A natural 
question that comes up here is: how responsive remittances are to price oil variations? In the 
rest of this paper we try to answer this question empirically by examining the cross elasticity 
of remittances from the GCC economies to price of oil. But first we present the data and 
methodology in the following section. 
Data and Methodology 
 
We collect data from three main sources; the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank (WDI), the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund, 
and the Arab Monetary Fund database. The data includes remittances, GCC government 
spending, GDP per capita of the world, price of crude oil and the US federal fund rate.
3 Using 
aggregate remittances raises a number of difficulties. First, some difficulties relate to the 
consistency of reporting as different countries use different labeling for remittances 
transactions. Second, a significant portion of remittances are sent through informal channels 
and consequently go undocumented. Particularly in the GCC countries, a popular informal 
channel is what so called “Hawala” which means “a money transfer”.  Under Hawala, the 
money is transferred opaquely through a network of agents operating between the two 
countries, the sending and the receiving end. For these reasons we use a more inclusive and 
clearer measure of remittances that is reported under the Worker’s Remittances and 
Compensation rather than the one reported in the balance of payments. In total, we have an 
unbalanced panel data of six countries with annual data between 1971 and 2004 which sums 
up to 130 observations. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the remittances and GDP 
per capita variables along with the data availability for each country. Qatar has the highest 
GDP per capita and highest remittances per capita of all the GCC countries (around $ 2,300), 
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 followed by the UAE and Bahrain. Figure 4 shows the trend of the mean of remittances per 
capita from 1971 to 2004. The remittances per capita have been increasing in a steady manner 
except for the First Gulf War in 1991 and the September 11 attacks of 2001.  Figure 5 depicts 
the trends of the percentage change in remittances versus the percentage change in price of 
oil. Both variables tend to move largely in tandem except for incidents of drop in remittances 
during major political or military engagements in the Middle East in the past three to four 
decades. 
The pegging of GCC currencies to the dollar and the full dependence on oil exports have 
deprived these countries of exerting full fledge monetary and fiscal policies.
4 Interest rates 
follow closely the benchmark policy rate in the US, the federal funds rate (FFR), and central 
banks orchestrate money supply to maintain the pegged exchange rates. In addition, these 
economies have enjoyed budget surpluses throughout the many years of high prices of oil, 
which allowed them not only to exempt their citizens from any sort of taxes but also to 
provide subsidies in various ways (for example allowance for housing, marriage gifts, and 
free land). Thus fiscal policy is confined to government spending. Remittances from these 
economies in large sums pose a challenge to both monetary policy and fiscal policy as well. 
This monetary leakage mitigates the efficacy of investment and spending multipliers. We 
further discuss the ramifications of these effects below. 
Given the issues discussed above, we set up a reduced form model of the following 
specification: 
                                                               (1)                              ;         ;            ;           
      
                  
Where   is the amount of remittances per capita sent from the GCC countries,   the price of 
crude oil,     represents the GDP per capita of the receiving countries, 
 represents the GCC governments’ per capita spending, and       is the 
United States federal funds rate. The economic performance of the GCC economies has been 
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 reliant on oil export receipts and therefore, one would expect that the higher the price of 
crude oil, the higher the aggregate demand, and hence the higher the remittances. This 
dynamic simply signifies that more expatriates leads to more remittances being sent to the 
countries of origin. Furthermore, the literature on remittances has examined the relationship 
between the receiving countries’ GDP growth and the amount of money being remitted from 
abroad. This relationship depends on the primary motivation behind remitting whether 
altruism or self-interest. Remittances are expected to be positively related to the GDP growth 
of the receiving country if self-interest is the main force while in other studies these two 
variables are found to be negatively related if altruism is the main motivation to remit (Chami 
et al (2006)). We include government spending to control for fiscal policy and the federal 
funds rate to control for monetary policy. Most of the macro projects in the GCC countries 
are government funded (or funded through semi-government corporations) and therefore 
most of the income received by the expatriates is directly related to government expenditures.  
In order to capture the elasticity of remittances with respect to the price of oil we examine the 
following log-linear equation: 
                                      ln                                               
                                           
        
              
          
 
   0
                                                                 (2)                         
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Where    represents remittances per capita sent from country  ,   represents the per 
capita gross domestic product of the world,    is the price of crude oil,      is 
the per capita government expenditure of the GCC countries and     is the US 
federal funds rate all at time  . All variables are in per capita terms in order to control for 
population and specifically for the increase in the growth of expatriates as percentage of the 
GCC population. Also, all variable are in real terms. Our main objective is to estimate    . As 
outlined above, we expect a positive relationship between the price of crude oil and 
remittances (  ).  We postulate that if we can formulate a better understanding of the variations of remittances effects on the Gulf economies, policy makers will be better 
equipped to devise proper monetary policy that overcomes the difficulties inherited by the 
attachment of domestic interest rates to the FFR and to some extent offset the deficiency of 
fiscal policy inflicted by the absence of a taxing system.    
Results 
The results of equation (2) are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Both results of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) are reported. All coefficients are reported with robust 
standard errors in parenthesis.  
  The coefficients of the price of oil which are at the center of our study, in both 
specifications are positive and significant. These are 0.37 (for OLS) and 0.24 (FE). The fact 
that the elasticity of per capita remittances with respect to price of oil is under 0.5 suggests 
that the response of remittances to price of oil is inelastic. However, this inelasticity of per-
capita remittances to price of oil is robust to both estimation techniques.  
Table 3 also presents the elasticity of remittances with respect to the GDP of the world and to 
government spending. The positive relationship between remittances and the GDP world 
suggests that remittances from the expatriates in the GCC to their home countries are driven 
by self-interest rather than by altruism. The responsiveness of these flows is very large (the 
elasticity is larger than three). As for the sensitivity to fiscal policy, the per-capita 
government spending does not seem significant when we use FE specification as compared to 
OLS. Thus result suggests that GCC economies differ in their fiscal policies efficacy for 
when we control for each country’s effect the coefficient on government spending got 
weakened. This result suggests that the spending multipliers across the GCC countries vary 
with various levels of remittances. If the country is ranked high on remittances as percentage 
of its GDP (for example Bahrain), leading to high monetary leakages, then one expects a 
lower government spending multiplier in this economy. In this case the government needs to 
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 make additional spending to curb a recession and a slight reduction in spending than desirable 
in order to mitigate inflation.  
The positive and significant coefficient of the US federal fund rate indicates that an increase 
in the US interest rate raises the per capita remittances from the GCC countries. An increase 
in the interest rate signals a contractionary monetary policy in the US and is usually a 
response to an expansionary US economy. Therefore, remittances from the gulf region seem 
to respond to business cycles of the US economy through the arbitration of the price of oil.   
   One could argue that remittances are directly related to the GDP per capita of the 
World since an increase in the World economic activities generally means that people have 
higher income and therefore remit more money. Table 4 substitutes the GDP per capita of the 
World with the GDP per capita of three regions; East Asia and Pacific, South Asia and Sub 
Saharan Africa. These three regions combined cover the majority of the main countries of 
origin of the labour force or expatriates in the GCC (Philippines under East Asia and Pacific; 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka under South Asia and Sudan under Sub 
Saharan Africa). The results shown in Table 4 conform to those of Table 3 in that the 
elasticity of remittances per capita is between 0.55 (OLS) and 0.35 (FE), where the OLS 
estimations seem to represent an upper bound while the FE estimations represent a lower 
bound for the elasticity. The coefficients for the government spending and the US Federal 
Fund rate mimic those in Table 3 except that they both lose significance under FE. The 
interesting finding in Table 4 is the sign on the GDP per capita of the three regions: positive 
for East Asia and Pacific and negative for both South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa. The 
difference in signs suggests disparity in the effect of remittances on economic growth in the 
receiving regions and could be indicative of diverse motives of remitting across expatriates in 
the GCC.  
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 To summarise, this paper highlights the large amounts of remittances from the GCC countries 
and their response to price of oil changes. In what follows we highlight the major concerns of 
the impact of the outflow remittances of GCC on their economies. 
1.  Pressure on exchange rates: remitting money home by expatriates distorts the 
market of exchange rate by placing pressure on foreign reserves. As GCC countries 
peg their currencies to the US dollar, by remitting money, the expatriates are 
converting the local currency into their home currency or into a more easily 
converted and widely accepted currency like the dollar or the euro. Thus exerting 
additional pressure on GCC central banks to keep high foreign reserves in order to 
maintain the pegged exchange rate.  
2.  Pressure on fiscal policy: given the sheer size of the money fleeing the economy, it 
is expected that this would weaken the efficacy of the fiscal policy.  The growing 
size of these remittances adds downward pressure on the government spending 
multiplier. In other words, when the government plans to boost spending in case of 
recession, this spending level should be relatively higher to offset the remittances 
leakage. 
3.  Pressure on monetary policy: as the monetary policy of the GCC countries is closely 
linked to the US monetary policy because of the pegging of their currencies to the 
dollar, interest rates volatility follows that of the United States. However, the 
pressure of remittances is felt on the money supply and therefore on the money 
multiplier. The lack of the Open Market Operations in the Gulf economies (that is 
the selling of government bonds to the public) can be thought of as the same as 
remittances outflow in terms of reducing money supply to curb inflation for 
example. However, one major difference is that remittances leave the economy for 
good and is therefore not circulated within the borders of the domestic economy as 
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 in the case of the Open Market Operations. Also, the other difference is that the 
GCC countries have neither control over the timing nor the magnitude of the 
remittance operations. This issue gets more malleable when the GCC economies get 
united under one monetary union issuing a single currency. 
4.  Pressure on investment. The lack of re-investing opportunities of expatriates’ 
income in most GCC economies (for example prohibition of owning property by 
expatriates) hinders the real economic activity. Given that the money generated in 
these countries is not fully recycled domestically puts a downward pressure on the 
investment multiplier. 
Conclusion  
This paper presents an empirical exercise to estimate the elasticity of remittances with respect 
to price of crude oil. The literature on remittances has studied extensively the determinants 
and consequences of remittances in the receiving countries. However, there is a wide gap in 
the literature regarding remittances effect on the remitting countries. This paper contributes to 
the remittances literature by examining the elasticity of remittances with respect to price of 
crude oil. We focus on the GCC countries since most of these countries are considered top 
ten senders of remittances by either the value of remittances or by percentage of GDP. The 
response of remittances to changes in price of oil is inelastic (less than 0.5). The GCC 
countries can use this information to predict the magnitude of remittances sent by expatriates 
following any shock to the price of crude oil such as the last financial crisis. Unraveling the 
importance of remittances on the GCC economies allows policy makers and investors to 
better identify the implications on fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rates, and 
investment. Furthermore, this study outlines the types of pressures that remittances might 
impose on the sending countries: pressures on exchange rates, investment, fiscal and 
11 
 monetary policy. Quantifying these pressures is of great interest but we leave this issue for 


























1. Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2008. 
2. Interest rates for UAE are not publicly available. 
3. The source and definitions of the variables are presented in the Appendix. 
4. With the exception of Kuwait which has abolished pegging to the dollar in favour of a 
basket of currencies. Local experts believe that the dollar has the largest weight in the 
Kuwaiti basket of currencies but these allegations have not been confirmed or rejected by 
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 Table 1: Remittances Values from the GCC 2006 
Country  Remittances Sent 
$ Billion  Rank in the World  Remittances Sent 
Percent of GDP  Rank in the World 
Bahrain 1.5  30
th   12  4
th  
Kuwait 3.0  18
th   4  12
th  
Oman 2.8  21
st    5.8*  - 
Qatar 3.7^  -  -  - 
Saudi Arabia  15.6  2
nd   5  9
th  
UAE 6.1^  -  -  - 











































 Table 2: Remittances in Total Values and in Per Capita, GDP per Capita  
Country Variable  Mean  Min  Max 
Bahrain  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 6.34e+08  3.30 e+08  1.29 e+09 
(1980 – 2004)  Remittances per Capita in $ 1184.1  637.1  1935.6 
Obs. = 25  GDP Per Capita in $ 10874.6  8764  13988.5 
      
Kuwait  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 1.17 e+09  2.76 e+08  2.40 e+09 
(1975 – 1989 and 
1995 – 2004)  Remittances per Capita in $ 617.0  274.0  976.9 
Obs. = 25  GDP Per Capita in $ 18150.6  11883.3  27113.6 
      
Oman  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 9.60 e+08  1.11 e+08  1.83 e+09 
(1974 – 2004)  Remittances per Capita in $ 502.2  126.8  736.5 
Obs. = 31  GDP Per Capita in $ 6760.7  3792.6  9497.5 
      
Qatar  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 1.56 e+09  1.26 e+09  2.18 e+09 
(1999 – 2004)  Remittances per Capita in $ 2308.2 2132.9 2846.8 
Obs. = 6  GDP Per Capita in $ 28824.8  21005  41755 
      
Saudi Arabia  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 8.50 e+09  2.07 e+08  1.81e+10 
(1971 – 2004)  Remittances per Capita in $ 510.3  34.5  1002.9 
8Obs. = 34  GDP Per Capita in $ 11026.5  8439.7  16428.9 
      
UAE  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 3.79 e+09  3.13 e+09  4.65 e+09 
(1996 – 2004)  Remittances per Capita in $ 1180.9 1131.8 1257.8 
Obs. = 9  GDP Per Capita in $ 22774.4  21703.9  24339.2 
      
Sample  Remittances Sent in $ Billion 3.13 e+09  1.11 e+08  1.81 e+10 
Obs. = 130  Remittances per Capita in $ 787.9  34.54  2846.8 
  GDP Per Capita in $ 13035.6  3792.6  41755 
Notes: Remittances for Qatar and UAE are from the Arab Monetary Fund online databases. The GDP per 























 Table 3: Elasticity of Remittances: GDP Per Capita World 
Variable OLS  FE 
    
Price of Oil  0.373***  0.240** 
 (0.110)  (0.083) 
    
GDP per Capita World  3.483***  2.902*** 
 (0.511)  (1.162) 
    
GCC Gov. Spending  Per Capita  0.427***  0.089 
 (0.079)  (0.138) 
    
US Federal Fund Rate  0.036*  0.039** 
 (0.019)  (0.013) 
    
    0.56 0.52 
Sample 102  102 
Notes: 1. All variables except the Federal Fun Rate are in logarithm form. 2. *** indicates significant at the 0.01 
level, ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level and * indicates significant at the 0.1 level. 3. Robust standard 
































 Table 4: Elasticity of Remittances: GDP Per Capita Regions 
Variable OLS  FE 
    
Price of Oil  0.557***  0.351* 
 (0.140)  (0.170) 
    
GDP per Capita East Asia and Pacific  0.474  1.346** 
 (0.998)  (0.404) 
    
GDP per Capita South Asia  0.001  -1.959** 
 (0.998)  (0.542) 
    
GDP per Capita Sub Saharan Africa  -3.379*  -1.989 
 (1.791)  (2.927) 
    
GCC Gov. Spending  Per Capita  0.442***  0.104 
 (0.079)  (0.133) 
    
US Federal Fund Rate  0.036*  0.033 
 (0.019)  (0.019) 
    
    0.58 0.55 
Sample 102  102 
Notes: 1. All variables except the Federal Fun Rate are in logarithm form. 2. *** indicates significant at the 0.01 
level, ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level and * indicates significant at the 0.1 level. 3. Robust standard 















































































Definitions of Variables    
Variable Source 
Remittances: Workers' remittances and compensation of 
employees comprise current transfers by migrant workers and 
wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers.  
World Development Indicators 
(WDI). Arab Monetary Fund 
(AMF) for Qatar and UAE 
Income Per Capita: GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population.   WDI, AMF for Qatar 
Total Population: Total population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of 
legal status or citizenship. 
 
WDI 
Consumer Price Index: reflects changes in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services 
that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as 
yearly. 
WDI, AMF for Oman and UAE 
Price of Crude Oil: US dollar per barrel  (International Financial Statistics) 
IFS 
US Federal Fund Rate: Federal funds effective rate  Federal Reserve System Statistical 
Release 
 